by Louis Werner - Special to the Middle East Times
July 14, 2007
NEW YORK -- The hallmark of democracy is that it allows for the self-correction of government policies. Whether from the privacy of a ballot box, or the public arena of free speech and a free press, the necessary political will eventually emerges to change a bad policy or to stop it dead in the water. But such political will falters in the case of US foreign policy regarding Israel, which - for a variety of structural and historical reasons - has been set on a self-defeating course ever since the June 1967 war.
Examples abound of policy self-corrections that have saved America from disasters both large and small. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's defeat of Herbert Hoover in 1932 at the height of the Depression brought a laissez-faire economy out of its tailspin with new interventionist policies. Vietnam War demonstrators and combat-zone reporters like David Halberstam convinced militarist politicians, however belatedly, to end a futile conflict and discard a faulty-domino theory. Of less dire consequence: when economists have shown that cuts in small but cherished public subsidies lead to better outcomes for everybody, even populist politicians have usually gone along.
But the case of US policy toward Israel is different. In spite of ample evidence that the blind American embrace of anything and everything Israel does in the occupied territories and to its neighbors severely hurts US interests in the region, America's pro-Israel tilt remains as slanted as the leaning tower of Pisa. Over a period of 40 years, this policy has only gone further askew.
The structural reasons for this failure to self-correct were examined last year by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer in their analysis of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, both through the strong-arm political tactics of groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and in the more apparently neutral policy analysis of such Israel-aligned think tanks as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the American Enterprise Institute.
But political lobbying is the great game in Washington, and as long as its disclosure rules are followed, and lobbyists for foreign governments register themselves as such, there is no permanent threat to the national interest. AIPAC has lost, lately, its share of skirmishes. Jonathan Pollard, the Navy intelligence analyst convicted of spying for Israel, is still in prison, despite the lobby's strong push for his release. Walt's and Mearsheimer's report had a fair hearing, despite charges of anti-Semitism from the lobby's top guns, and pressure on the press to bury its coverage - their article was published in the London Review of Books after The Atlantic Monthly backed out of its promise to run it.
What might better explain the runaway US policy toward Israel are a series of historical phenomena, all, in fact, incidental to the internal dynamics of US-Israeli relations. These include the Cold War, a post-Vietnam envy of any ally that could claim an overwhelming military victory, the growing electoral clout of the Christian fundamentalists, and the post-9/11 "war on terror"- each one lining up perfectly in Israel's favor. The Israel lobby has played these cards brilliantly, but was dealt them by the coincidence of fate, not by any of its own doing.
These consecutive accidents of history have cemented a bad policy into place. When the Cold War ended, Israel's value to the US as an anti-Soviet strategic asset declined, but, just then, the evangelical Christian voting bloc arose to offer unconditional religious support. Even in the détente years, the Israeli military was the darling of the Pentagon - still smarting from defeat in Southeast Asia - because of its supremacy in the Middle East. And now, just as the Christian bloc is in the process of breaking apart - following its cynical use by the George W. Bush presidency - comes the tactical argument to align with Israel as an intelligence-sharing ally with previous experience fighting "terrorists" in a "dangerous neighborhood."
But like a seismic fault that, rather than undergoing a series of minor tremors that release building pressure, holds everything back until the big one strikes, a new US policy toward Israel, if it comes, may shake up both sides of the alliance. American politicians and policymakers may feel free to openly criticize Israel while in office, rather than after they leave, as is now the case. And pro-settler Israeli politicians may find their positions costing much American coin for both themselves, and their government.
Just now, no such policy change seems possible for the simple reason that the Middle East's post-9/11 architecture - "with us" nations versus "against us" nations - will likely remain standing, even after President Bush is replaced by a Democrat, however attuned he or she may be to world opinion surveys showing that US handling of the Israeli-Palestinian issue is the top impediment to American regional goals. Thus, the leaning tower of the US' pro-Israel policy seems unlikely to be righted in the near future.
July 14, 2007
NEW YORK -- The hallmark of democracy is that it allows for the self-correction of government policies. Whether from the privacy of a ballot box, or the public arena of free speech and a free press, the necessary political will eventually emerges to change a bad policy or to stop it dead in the water. But such political will falters in the case of US foreign policy regarding Israel, which - for a variety of structural and historical reasons - has been set on a self-defeating course ever since the June 1967 war.
Examples abound of policy self-corrections that have saved America from disasters both large and small. Franklin Delano Roosevelt's defeat of Herbert Hoover in 1932 at the height of the Depression brought a laissez-faire economy out of its tailspin with new interventionist policies. Vietnam War demonstrators and combat-zone reporters like David Halberstam convinced militarist politicians, however belatedly, to end a futile conflict and discard a faulty-domino theory. Of less dire consequence: when economists have shown that cuts in small but cherished public subsidies lead to better outcomes for everybody, even populist politicians have usually gone along.
But the case of US policy toward Israel is different. In spite of ample evidence that the blind American embrace of anything and everything Israel does in the occupied territories and to its neighbors severely hurts US interests in the region, America's pro-Israel tilt remains as slanted as the leaning tower of Pisa. Over a period of 40 years, this policy has only gone further askew.
The structural reasons for this failure to self-correct were examined last year by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer in their analysis of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, both through the strong-arm political tactics of groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and in the more apparently neutral policy analysis of such Israel-aligned think tanks as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and the American Enterprise Institute.
But political lobbying is the great game in Washington, and as long as its disclosure rules are followed, and lobbyists for foreign governments register themselves as such, there is no permanent threat to the national interest. AIPAC has lost, lately, its share of skirmishes. Jonathan Pollard, the Navy intelligence analyst convicted of spying for Israel, is still in prison, despite the lobby's strong push for his release. Walt's and Mearsheimer's report had a fair hearing, despite charges of anti-Semitism from the lobby's top guns, and pressure on the press to bury its coverage - their article was published in the London Review of Books after The Atlantic Monthly backed out of its promise to run it.
What might better explain the runaway US policy toward Israel are a series of historical phenomena, all, in fact, incidental to the internal dynamics of US-Israeli relations. These include the Cold War, a post-Vietnam envy of any ally that could claim an overwhelming military victory, the growing electoral clout of the Christian fundamentalists, and the post-9/11 "war on terror"- each one lining up perfectly in Israel's favor. The Israel lobby has played these cards brilliantly, but was dealt them by the coincidence of fate, not by any of its own doing.
These consecutive accidents of history have cemented a bad policy into place. When the Cold War ended, Israel's value to the US as an anti-Soviet strategic asset declined, but, just then, the evangelical Christian voting bloc arose to offer unconditional religious support. Even in the détente years, the Israeli military was the darling of the Pentagon - still smarting from defeat in Southeast Asia - because of its supremacy in the Middle East. And now, just as the Christian bloc is in the process of breaking apart - following its cynical use by the George W. Bush presidency - comes the tactical argument to align with Israel as an intelligence-sharing ally with previous experience fighting "terrorists" in a "dangerous neighborhood."
But like a seismic fault that, rather than undergoing a series of minor tremors that release building pressure, holds everything back until the big one strikes, a new US policy toward Israel, if it comes, may shake up both sides of the alliance. American politicians and policymakers may feel free to openly criticize Israel while in office, rather than after they leave, as is now the case. And pro-settler Israeli politicians may find their positions costing much American coin for both themselves, and their government.
Just now, no such policy change seems possible for the simple reason that the Middle East's post-9/11 architecture - "with us" nations versus "against us" nations - will likely remain standing, even after President Bush is replaced by a Democrat, however attuned he or she may be to world opinion surveys showing that US handling of the Israeli-Palestinian issue is the top impediment to American regional goals. Thus, the leaning tower of the US' pro-Israel policy seems unlikely to be righted in the near future.
No comments:
Post a Comment